Are We Gonna See the Original Band of the Hawk Again

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Written by J.Hawk exclusively for SouthFront.

Always since assuming office, the Biden Administration has been probing countries information technology designated equally America'southward enemies for weaknesses through a diversity of provocations. So far this approach has not had any successes. China plainly told Biden's SecState Blinken to go packing, Iran is showing no eagerness to kowtow to Washington under new management, and Russian federation itself has stayed the course, brushing off verbal attacks and promising either in-kind or asymmetrical responses to whatsoever new chicaneries from Washington or Brussels.

That does not mean that Washington has acknowledged defeat. Unwilling to concede, information technology is liable to escalate a crisis situation elsewhere. Since Navalny'southward perennial "poisonings", "hunger strikes", and "leg pains" take not had the desired effect on Western governments and his life and wellness are moreover quite secure in a Russian prison house, so the prospect of a new state of war in Eastern Ukraine is back on the agenda, and the opponents of Nord Stream 2 now have two things to pray for: Aleksey Navalny's death and a Russia-Ukraine war.

Zelensky on the Spot

The Russian authorities has made information technology clear on numerous occasions that it is adhering to the Minsk Agreements, will not abandon the Donbass, but at the same time volition non escalate the state of affairs out of the desire to minimize the impairment to all concerned. In applied terms information technology ways a continuation of "coercive affairs". Russian military forcefulness volition exist used only if Ukraine attempts to create facts on the footing through offensive activeness. For that reason it is unlikely in the farthermost that Russia volition be the one to escalate first. It is worth remembering that both the summer 2014 campaign and the winter 2014/15 campaign were initiated by Kiev which first sent troops and bombers to suppress the and then-peaceful protests against the Maidan and referenda to secede, and then to hope to rapidly resolve the stalemate. Both operations concluded in failure through the efforts of the hastily assembled and armed militias of the breakaway republics, with some "Northern Wind" armed forces support that decimated Ukrainian forces.

Poroshenko survived the disasters that shredded the Ukrainian military thanks to the alliances he'southward made with the nationalists while preparing for the Maidan. Zelensky's position is considerably weaker and more vulnerable to the consequences of a military defeat. Having been elected on a promise to stop the war in the Donbass, he has already badly disappointed his supporters on that score. Just his transformation into a warhawk, perhaps best characterized past his awkward appearances on the front lines wearing an ill-fitting helmet and a remarkably brusque armor vest, has non earned him even grudging respect from the nationalists and neo-Nazis on whose shoulders much of Ukraine's war effort rests. While Poroshenko could get out of many a tight spot with his "Contemptuous Baderite" jacket, Zelensky is now a very lonely person in Kiev, a earnest to the decisions of Ukraine's National Security and Defense Council whose decisions he automatically signs, in contrast with Poroshenko who oft simply ignored them.

In practise it means that Zelensky might exist in process of being a scapegoat for Ukraine's all-just-inevitable defeat at the easily of Russian forces hastening to aid the republics in the event of Ukraine'south armed services scoring early on victories. Blackmail might be playing a office in Zelensky's calculus too. There were persistent reports in March of an imminent release of a documentary implicating Zelensky's office in the failure of Ukrainian intelligence operation to lure Wagner assembly to Ukraine in order to imprison and effort them. At the same time, if Zelensky sends his war machine to a defeat, his reputation will be gravely damaged, peradventure to the point of forcing him to resign and even endangering his life. His nervous activity of the first week of April, including a total non-sequitur of a visit to NATO headquarters in social club to plead for Ukraine'south quick admission to the alliance, is indicative of a man in a tight spot with no piece of cake ways out.

Resistible Force Meets Immovable Object

Zelensky might be in a less anxious mood if he had a reliable military instrument to wield. The Ukrainian Armed Forces are non that instrument. While the Russian military entered 2014 rather unprepared for the prospect of high-intensity land warfare thanks to the Serdyukov reforms that fabricated the brigade the main tactical unit, since that time much lost basis has been recovered through the reactivation of several divisions and armies, such equally the Start Guards Tank Ground forces, and modernization of Land Forces' equipment. Russia'due south military today is a considerably more impressive forcefulness than it was seven years ago.

Meanwhile Ukraine's armed forces stagnated. Unmodernized T-64 remains its most numerous master battle tank while production of light armored vehicles proceeds at a trickle. Considering that artillery has been the most active arm in the years of static warfare along the line of separation, Ukraine'due south "god of war" remains in poor shape and is suffering from ammunition shortage. In the last decade, Ukraine has suffered seven major ammunition depot explosions, in addition to the tremendous expenditure of munitions during the 2014 and 2015 battles and the occasional escalations of shelling since. Since Ukraine is a failing state that cannot even maintain its aging civilian infrastructure, information technology is little wonder that it has failed to establish domestic munitions manufacture. It did receive some supplies of weapons and munitions from NATO member states which take stores of Soviet-pattern weapons themselves, most notably Bulgaria, but piddling in the style of heavy artillery munitions. Since Ukraine too does non manufacture artillery pieces, specifically the engineering-intensive barrels, for either its tanks or howitzers, the existing artillery park is beingness gradually used upwards, and every vanquish fired non only diminishes existing reserves only also adds to the vesture and tear of the artillery pieces. An attempt to provide cheap indirect burn capabilities by procuring 120mm "Molot" mortars manufactured in a factory owned past Poroshenko did not live up to expectations. There have been several cases of these mortars bursting during alive burn exercises, with dire consequences for their crews. And if a simple technology of a mortar cannot be mastered by Ukraine's defence industry, what success tin it have attempting more challenging tasks?

Nor is the human factor any meliorate. To borrow Wellington'due south characterization of his own soldiers, UAF rank and file are "scum of the earth, enlisted to drink." Military service remains highly unpopular and attracts only those who cannot detect lucrative employment in the noncombatant economic system—or abroad. Draft evasion and bribery of military recruitment officials is widespread, leading the Rada to drastically increase penalties for such activities to include lengthy prison terms. Fifty-fifty if such measures do not effect in an exodus of able-bodied males out of the land, they are inappreciably probable to fill the ranks with motivated recruits. In the starting time week of April 2021 lonely, Ukrainian forces have lost on boilerplate ane soldier a day to non-combat causes, which included alcohol and drug overdoses, careless handling of weapons, suicide, and murder. The single greatest killer of Ukrainian soldiers, even so, are their ain minefields, which have killed 57 soldiers and injured 126 betwixt July 27, 2020 (the beginning of the terminal ceasefire) and April 3, 2021, a statistic indicating a very low level of training and discipline.

Units themselves remain understrength. Some of the brigades are short of 60% of enlisted personnel and 30% of officers. Troops' depression morale translated into not just irregular and erratic training but likewise into poor equipment maintenance habits. An inspection of the 59^thursday Brigade whose results cruel into the hands of Novorossia intelligence services revealed that as of March 2020, some sixty% of the brigade's heavy weapons and vehicles were either profoundly behind their maintenance schedule or were altogether unserviceable. The brigade has non held whatever maneuvers because the fuel supplies delivered to its logistics units never made it to the actual tactical subunits, suggesting theft by brigade's leadership.

Cossack Mace

For all of the to a higher place reasons, a Ukrainian military operation, even a express i, seems unlikely in the immediate future. The very visible Ukrainian troop movements meant that no element of surprise could be achieved. The aim appears to accept been to relocate sizable formations to the Donbass so as to provide them with an power to launch a quick, virtually no-warning set on in the hereafter, after Novorossia'south vigilance has been dulled by months of alerts and provocations.

Unless other events intervene, the period of greatest danger volition be the Cossack Mace exercise held during the summer of 2021. The aim of the exercise which will take place nether British leadership is to do repelling a "Russian invasion" and then launching an offensive to secure the Ukraine-Russian federation border which would mean the stop of Novorossia.

The fact of British leadership is specially worrisome, since that state seems to have undertaken the job of "dirty tricks" on Washington's behalf. In this example, the "dirty trick" could be using the do to rehearse invasion of the Donbass immediately prior to its execution or, equally plausibly, the exercise itself might turn into an invasion. Foreign control of the invasion would exist consistent with the Ukrainian trend of slipping under direct command past Western powers, and reminiscent of the role of the Military Professional person Resources Incorporated (MPRI) in the planning and execution of Croatia's Operation Storm in 1995.

Ane can't fifty-fifty dominion out direct British participation in such an performance, since a British-supported Ukrainian offensive against Novorossia forces would not be an offensive against Russia. The Defence Review released in March 2021 stated that the British Regular army would stand upward four and then-called "ranger regiments", or battalion-sized formations whose aim would be to railroad train "indigenous forces" and, if need be, actually go to battle with them in society to pursue British interests every bit part of the "Global Britain" projection. An improver of professional person British soldiers, in conjunction with British planning and execution of the functioning, would provide a morale boost to the UAF and increase the chances of at to the lowest degree moderate success. Once embedded inside Ukrainian forces, British troops would as well serve equally a deterrent confronting a direct Russian intervention.

An Ounce of Prevention

It may well be that the sudden Russian troop movements, the reinforcement of Crimea, and even Belarus' deployment to the edge of Ukraine, indicate contingency planning to launch an enveloping counteroffensive that would trap Ukrainian forces in a giant cauldron between the Dnepr River and Novorossia itself. At the very least, their presence forces Ukraine to divert forces away from its offensive grouping on the Donbass toward the edge with Russia and even Belarus. It is as well possible that the snap deployment was intended to pre-empt Ukraine's increasingly obvious moves to mountain an offensive during the summer, an offensive with direct foreign war machine employment. Russia's pre-emption may as well include a changed status of the Donbass. President Putin'due south annunciation that the rights of 600,000 holders of Russian passports in Novorossia has become a priority for him. An official recognition of Novorossia, combined with the placement of a Russian peacekeeper force, would stop the Ukrainian offensive dead in its tracks and moreover return any British participation unsustainable, though at certain diplomatic cost due to the withdrawal from the Minsk Agreements it would entail. The forceful Russian response has already had the effect of knocking not only Ukraine but, judging by the panicky demands for Russia to "explain" its troop movements, all of NATO. It communicated that under no circumstances will Ukraine savour tactical, operational, or strategic surprise. Now the question is whether Russia and major European powers can craft a diplomatic solution that will allow Zelensky to back down in a face-saving mode, thus catastrophe the danger of war against the Donbass.

British "ranger regiments" and "greyzone warfare"

Utilize of NATO forces directly vs. unrecognized republics is no the same as use of NATO forces against Russia. Recognition by Russian federation would, on the other manus, create an additional layer of deterrence, though associated with risks for Russia.

If LPR/DPR are formally recognized past the Russian federation which and so spreads the umbrella of "extended deterrence" which, it should be noted, is backed by a potent nuclear arsenal. Information technology would also mean Russia's formal rejection of Minsk Agreements and of the Normandy Iv format, creating a legal limbo fraught with unpredictability. NATO countries which committed themselves to preserving Ukraine's "sovereignty and integrity" could inappreciably exist expected to ratify this move.

Major minelaying operations by Ukrainian forces, which may be part of the offensive preparations. The greater the extent and intensity of mines on a certain sector of the front, the greater the ability to concentrate forces on other sectors—suggesting that whichever  sectors of the front are not seeing a minelaying operations are being reserved as corridors for futurity attack, making them eligible for DPR/LPR defensive minelaying.

More than ON THE TOPIC:

• State of war Between Russia And Ukraine Is Inevitable: Opinion
• The Saker: "Understanding Anti-Putin PSYOPS: Preparing For War"

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Source: https://southfront.org/the-donbass-war-of-2021/

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